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SOCIAL JUSTICE 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS* 
Carl Wellman 
In recent decades we have witnessed a multitude of increa-
singly urgent demands for social justice and for the protection 
of human rights. PoliticaHy, those struggling to promote social 
justice have worked hand in hand with human rights advocates. 
The social injustices of racial and sexual discrimination have 
been protested as violations of the fundamental human rights to 
equal opportunity and to the equal protection of the laws; a 
human right to an adequate standard of living has be en pro-
claimed on the basis of the injustice of an aftluent society in which 
the rich can enjoy luxuries while the poor lack the means to 
meet their basic human needs. Such political arguments suggest 
to the thoughtful observer that there is sorne close connection 
between social justice and human rights. At the same time, we 
have read, or tried to find the time to read, a deluge of books 
and articles dealing with the theory of justice and the theory of 
rights. What is remarkable about these two bodies of philoso-
hical and jurisprudential literature is their virtual isolation from 
each other. In the index to A Theory 01 Justice, the monumen-
tal 587-page book by John Rawls, there are only three referen-
ces to natural rights and none at aH to human rights. The vast 
literature dealing with rights takes individual freedom or indivi-
dual interest as central, depending upon whether the author is 
advancing a will theory or an interest theory of rights, but 
hardly mentions justice, whether individual or social. This is aH 
the more surprising because philosophers and jurist typicaHy 
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as sume that justice and rights are necessarily connected. The 
more 1 ponder the practical politics and moral theory of the 
past few decades, the more puzzling, and important, appears to 
me the problem 1 intend to address today: What is the relation 
between social justice and human rights? 
Since my subject is complicated and controversial, it may 
be well to avoid unnecessary confusion by defining my terms at 
the very beginning. Many different kinds of things may be said 
to be just or unjust-persons, their acts, even their judgments, 
social systems, institutions, and laws. By «social justice» 1 
shall mean the justice of a society, and of its acts and institu-
tions. The sort of a society 1 have in mind is a politically orga-
nized group of people occupying a limited territory and 
distinguished from other such groups by a shared history, cul-
ture and set of institutions. Thus, 1 intend to simplify my dis-
cussion by excluding consideration of the justice or injustice of 
more limited societies, such as the General Motors Corpora-
tion, Washington University or the American Philosophical 
Association, as well as that of international societies, such as 
the United Nations or the IVR. Even so, social justice is far 
from simple, for it encompasses, but is not restricted to, politi-
cal justice, legal justice and economic justice, that is, the jus-
tice or injustice of the political, legal and economic systems of 
a society. 
Each of us possesses a variety of rights by virtue of our 
various stations in life . As a member of the faculty of Washing-
ton University, 1 have the right to use its libraries; as a citizen 
of the United States, 1 have a right to the protection of its 
diplomatic corps. As a member of my audience, you have a 
right that 1 speak sincerely and thoughtfully to you; as a mem-
ber of the IVR, you have a right to vote in its General 
Assembly next Wednesday. By «a human right» 1 mean a 
moral right that one possesses as a human being. It is not 
merely that human rights are necessarily possessed by human 
beings; being human is all that is necessary to confer this sort 
of rights upon the individual. As 1 shall use the expression, a 
human right is one species of moral rights. There is also a spe-
cies of legal rights that are quite properly called «human 
rights», for example, those legal rights enjoyed by many Euro-
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peans by virtue of the fact that their governments have ratified 
the European Convention on Human Rights. But 1 shall set 
aside such rights for the time being in order to avoid ambiguity 
in my language and to recognize the fact that modern theories 
of human rights are the contemporary descendants of the tradi-
tional theories of natural rights. 
1 shall not limit the domain of human right& to fundamental 
rights. A right that is logically fundamental in one moral sys-
tem may be derivative in another, and a right that is of funda-
mental importance in one century or one part of the world may 
be less important or even irrelevant to the political debates or 
individual lives in another time or place. Nor shall 1 stipulate 
that human rights are necessarily equal. If it is possible to pos-
sess the capacities of a human being to a greater or lesser 
extent, it might be possible for one person to possess more or 
less of a human right. It would be prejudicial, as well as futile, 
to attempt to settle such issues by mere definition. The protper 
function of definition is to clarify, not to beg, the question. My 
question can now be reformulated as follows: What is the rela-
tion between the justice of a society, and of its acts and institu-
tions, and the moral rights individual s possess as human 
beings? 
Sorne philosophers may believe that social justice and 
human rights are logically connected because they as sume that 
the concept of justice is implicit in the very concept of a moral 
right. Indeed, Hugo Grotius defines «a right» in terms of 
justice. 
Jus. Right, has another signification, derived from the former, 
as when we say my Reight. In this sense Right is a moral 
quality by which a person is competent to have or do a cer-
tain thing justly (pp. 4-5). 
The former signification of «Jus», from which the concept 
of a right is said to be derived, is that of what is right, meaning 
not unjust or not contrary to the law of nature (Grotius, pp. 3-
4). This definition explains how the possession of a moral right 
can make morally permissible actions that would ~therwise be 
impermissible. Thus, to say that a soldier has a right to kill an 
enemy combatant in time of war might be to say that he is in a 
moral position to do so without violating the moral law and, 
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therefore, that the soldier's act of killing is not, in contrast to 
acts of murder, morally wrong. This seems to capture the weak 
sense of «a right» as a libe rty , but it fails to explain how or 
why a right typically imposes duties upon second parties. 
One might try to sove this problem by defining a c1aim-
right, or a right correlative to an obligation, in terms of the 
third sense of «Jus» Grotius distinguishes, that of what is right 
as obligatory, not merely permitted by but required by justice 
or the natural law (p. 9). For example, to say that a soldier 
has a right not to be killed after surrendering might be to say 
that justice imposes a duty upon others, especially his captors, 
not to kill him after he has surrendered and thrown down his 
arms. To my mind, there are two weaknesses in this attempt to 
save the conceptual analysis of rights in terms of justice. For 
one thing, it takes the language of rights to be fundamentally 
ambiguous, for it defines liberty-rights in terms of what is per-
mitted by justice and c1aim-rights by what is required by jus-
tice. In the absence of compelling linguistic evidence of 
ambiguity, a univocal definition is more plausible, as well as 
more useful in the formulation of any general theory of rights. 
For another thing, to define rights in terms of liberties and 
duties only is to omit powers and immunities from the concept 
of a right. But one cannot explain what it means to say that a 
right-holder waives, alienates, c1aims or forfeits a right without 
recognizing such power-related aspects of the language of 
rights. 
Moreover, the reasoning underlying the attempt of Grotius 
to define rights in terms of justice is deeply flawed. He presup-
poses that moral rights are conferred by the natural law and 
that justice is determined by the natural · law. Now these 
assumptions may, if properIy understood, be true. But they do 
not necessarily imply that rights can be defined by justice. H. 
L. A. Hart has argued covincingly that not every moral code 
would confer rights. It the natural law is thought of as analo-
gous to the Ten Commandments, it would impose obligations 
but not confer rights (p. 182). Therefore, even if both moral 
rights and moral duties do arise from the natural law, moral 
rights arise from some spacial part or aspect of the moral law, 
not from natural law as a whole. Similarly, justice, in the strict 
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sense of that term, is determined by its entire breadth. Aristotle 
insited, and Grotius admitted (p. 9), that justice proper is only 
a limited part of morality. Hence, the assumption that both 
rights and justice reflect the natural law, even if true, does not 
imply any necessary connection between them, for they may be 
grounded in different parts of that law. 
Is there any reason to suppose that rights and justice arise 
from the same part or aspect of the natural law? Perhaps. As 
Hart and others have pointed out, the concept of a right is an 
essentially destributive concept (pp. 178, 180), in contrast to 
aggregative concepts like that of social utility, My right to life 
is quite distinct from your right to life, but my welfare and 
your welfare become indistinguishable in the sum total of the 
welfare enjoyed in our society. The concept of justice is also an 
essentially distributive concept, for justice seems by its very 
nature to concern the distribution of burdens or benefits, not 
the sum total of burdens or benefits. But I cannot see how this 
implies that the expression «a right» must or even can be de-
fined in terms of justice. What does seem to follow is that the 
allocation of rights, however defined, to the members of any 
society ought to be governed by the principIes of justice, whate-
ver these may be. This is a normative, rather than a logical or 
conceptual, connection between rights and justice. We should, I 
conclude, abandon the effort to define moral rights in terms 
of justice. 
While Grotius paid too little attention to the special nature 
of justice as only one limited part of morality, John Stuart MilI 
based his conception of justice squarely upon this insight. 
It seems to me that this feature in the one case -a right in 
sorne person, correlative to the moral obligation-constitutes 
the specific difference between justice, and generosity or bene-
ficence. Justice implies something which it is not only right to 
do, and wrong not to do, but which sorne individual person 
can claim from us as his moral right (p. 61). 
If any such definition of justice in terms of rights is correct, 
there may be, after aH, a logical connection between social jus-
tice and human rights. Let us, therefore, examine this proposal 
very carefully. 
MilI 's underIying reasoning is that justice can be defined in 
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terms of rights because the duties of justice are perfect duties 
and what distinguishes them from the imperfect duties of cha-
rity is that they are correlative to a claim-right of sorne 
second party. 
In the more precise language of philosophic jurists, duties of 
perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correla-
tive right resides in sorne person or persons; duties of imper-
fect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give 
birth to any right. I think it will be found that this distinction 
exactly coincides with that which exists between justice and 
the other obligations of morality (p. 61). 
I suggest that this way of thinking about justice is mistaken 
on at least two counts. Not every duty of justice is a perfect 
obligation. For example, each member of society has a duty to 
strive to eliminate, or at least reduce, the injustices found in 
the institutions of his or her society and to work greater justice 
in its legal, economic and political systems. But thereare a 
wide variety of ways in which one may fulfill this duty of jus-
tice, just as one has discretion as to how he or she fulfills the 
duty to contribute to charity. Moreover, according to Mill, jus-
tice demands only that one respect the claim-rights of all 
second parties, but in fact justice al so requires that individuals 
and societies respect liberty-rights, power-rights and immunity-
rights as well. For example, a society that denies racially 
mixed couples the liberty-right to marry or denies to any cou-
pIes the immunity-right to freedom from having their marriáges 
arranged for them by their relatives is unjust. It may even be, 
as sorne moral philosophers argue, that a society that denies 
same-sex couples the power-right to marry is unjust. In any 
event, we cannot explain the stringency of duties of justice by 
defining justice in terms of claim-rights. 
Indeed, any analysis of justice in terms of rights is ruled out 
by counter-examples. There are many violations of rights that 
are not unjust. As David Lyons reminds us 
When we are not riding our favorite philosophical theories, we 
do not hesitate to speal of rights to life, to liberty, to security 
of person, and so on. Such rights can be violated or infringed 
-by killing, hindering and coercing, assaulting, stealing- but 
it does not seem to follow, nor does it seem to be true, that 
the victim is thereby done an injustice. He may be wronged, but 
not all wrongs against particular persons are injustices (p. 17). 
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Similarly, individuals very probably have a human right not 
to be tortured, but violatioI1s of this right, whether by society 
or other individuals, are not necessarily unjust in the strict 
sense. Such acts are morally wrong because they impose intole-
rable suffering, not because they are unfair to their victims. 
Conversely, there are many injustices that are not violations 
of rights. One reason is that rights typically involve discretion. 
Therefore, if the right-holder chooses to accept unjust treat-
ment, he or she has the option of waiving any threatened right 
so that the injustice is not a violation of that right. 1 treat my 
wife unjustIy if 1 refuse to do my share of household tasks even 
though she also pursues a full -time career. Yet if she waives 
her right that 1 do my share of the chores, perhaps because she 
loves me in spite of my selfishness, then 1 do not violate her 
right by my unjust treatment of her. Again, the parent who con-
sistentIy gives fine and expensive gifts to the other child treats 
the latter unjustIy even though that child may have no right to 
be given any gift at aH, much less a costIy presento Hard cases 
like these show that one cannot establish any logical connection 
between social justice and human rights by defining justice in 
terms of rights. 
There are, however, other ways of conceiving of the relation 
between social justice and human rights. Although Gregory 
Vlastos, like Mill, defines justice in terms of rights, he does not 
use this definition in his reasoning to establish the central place 
of human rights in social justice. Instead, he begins with the 
thesis that social justice is fundamentaHy equalitarian. He 
reminds us that the great historic struggles for social justice 
have focussed upon sorne demand for equal rights, for example, 
the struggles against slavery, political absolutism, economic 
exploitation, the disenfranchisement of the lower c1asses and 
women, colonialism, and radial oppression. Nevertheless, justice 
does not demand complete equality. It is not unfair for the 
general to have authority over the private or for the legislator 
to have more political power than the ordinary citizen. The 
same justice that requires equal pay for equal work also requi-
res that those who work longer, harder or better earn more than 
their coworkers. But how is this possible? 
An equalitarian concept of justice may admit just inequalities 
without inconsistency if, and only if, it provides grounds for 
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equal human rights which are also grounds jor unequal rights 
oj other sorts (p. 40). 
The problem, of course, is to find sorne reason for the equa-
lit y of human rights that is also a reason for the inequality of 
other rights. 
The ultimate ground of social justice, according to Vlastos, 
is the equal human worth of aH persons, a worth measured by 
the equal value of each individual's (1) wellbeing and (2) free-
domo He then argues that 
(3) One manos (prima jacie) right to well-being is equal to 
that of any other, and (4) One manos (prima jacie) right to 
freedom is equal to that of any other. Then, given (4), he 
could see how this would serve as the basis for a great variety 
of rights to specific kinds of freedom: freedom of movement, 
of association, oC suffrage, of speech, of thought, of worship, 
of choice of employment, and the like. F or each of these can 
be regarded as simply a specification of the general right to 
freedom, and would thus be covered by the justification of the 
latter. Moreover, given (3), he could see in it the basis for 
various welfare-rights, such as the right to education, medical 
care, work under decent conditions, relief in periods of unem-
ployment, leisure, housing, etc . (p. 52). 
Thus, social justice requires specific sorts of equality 
because it is grounded in equal human rights. At the same time, 
it permits other sorts of social inequality because the equal 
human worth of aH persons also entails unequal rights of other 
sorts. For example, it is precisely because persons have equal 
rights to weH-being and freedom that, given the special factual 
circumstances of distributing praise for merit, their right to this 
particular good is unequal. Along similar lines one may argue 
that differences in economic reward, economic power, and poli-
tic al power are justified by equalitarian justice. Accordingly, 
Vlastos explains that the relation between social justice and 
human rights is that equalitarian justice is grounded primarily 
on equal human rights. 
Gregory Vlastos represents a venerable tradition that 
grounds demands for social equality upon human rights. The 
American Declaration of Independence, .the French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and the United Nations 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights a11 begin with pronoun-
cements of human equality formulated in terms of natural or 
human rights. One can readily appreciate the logic of basing 
arguments against social inequalities upon human rights, for if 
every human being does possess certain fundamental moral 
rights simply as a human being and if these rights rea11y are 
equal as we11 as universal, then political, economic, sexual or 
racial discrimination against any group of human beings must 
be unjust. 
Nevertheless, one must ask whether social justice is essen-
tially equalitarian. That is, is respect for the equal rights of a11 
individuals exhaustive of social justice? 1 believe not, for we 
must not forget the social relevance of what Joel Feinberg has 
ca11ed noncomparative justice. 
When our task is to do noncomparative justice to each of a 
large number of individual s , we do not compare them with 
each other, but rather we compare each in turn with an objec-
tive standard and judge each (as we say) «on his merits» . It 
follows that equality of treatment is no part of the concept of 
noncomparative justice, even though it is, of course, a central 
element in comparative justice. If we treat everybody unfairly, 
but equally and impartially so, we have done each an injustice 
that is, at best, only mitigated by the equal injustice done to 
all the others (p. 268). 
It is, for example, unjust to punish an innocent persono But 
this is not because it is unfair to treat this innocent person less 
we11 than the society treats other innocent persons; it is in and 
of itself unfair to punish this individual for a crime he or she 
has not committed. Suppose, to take a c10sely related example, 
a society has a legal system with rules of criminal law and 
. punishments for violations of these legal rules, but that its 
courts, if one may ca11 them that, make no provision for due 
process or fair trials. They might, let us imagine, throw dice to 
determine guilt or use a quota system so that the first fifteen 
individuals indicted each day are convicted and a11 others 
declared not guilty . Would the fact that every member of the 
society is equa11y subject to this legal system guarantee that 
there is no social injustice here? 1 think noto Again, consider a 
society that ignores the requirements of due notice so that wel-
fare benefits are universa11y terminated without any opportunity 
208 CARL WELLMAN 
for the individual recipient to appeal and receive a fair hearing. 
Once more this equality of treatment constitutes a grave social 
injustice. It is clear that equalitarian justice is only a part of 
social justice in its full complexity. 
Moreover, 1 doubt that the injustice of unequal treatment is 
always grounded on a failure to respect the equal rights of 
those affected. It may well be, as Vlastos could argue, that to 
allocate less police protection to black neighborhoods then to 
the white suburbs is unjust because it is a violation of the equal 
human right of blacks to security of the person, but this sort of 
argument seems inapplicable to a society that allocates less 
mail service to black neighborhoods, say a community in which 
mail is delivered to the suburbs every day but to the areas in 
which most blacks live only three times each week. Neither 
blacks nor whites have any moral right to public mail service; 
there is nothing unjust in a society where postal service is pro-
vided by private businesses. Thus, this sort of unequal treat-
ment is not unjust because it is in violation of equal rights. 
Where there are no rights to service, there are no equal rights 
to service. Nevertheless, this is a c1ear instance of a social 
injustice. Again, although one might be able to explain the 
injustice of discrimination against blacksor unmarried mothers 
in public welfare programs as a failure to respect the equal 
human right to social security of all individual s , one cannot 
explain the injustice of discrimination against black artist in 
public subsidies for the arts or discrimination against female 
researchers in awarding National Science Foundation grants in 
this manner, for applicants to such programs have no right to 
these forms of financial assistance. 
Vlastos might reply, however, that in these instances the 
racial or sexual discrimination is unjust because it is a violation 
of the human right to equitable treatment. But this reply, even 
if true, does not meet my objection to his theory. For one 
thing, this reply appeals to the right of each individual to equal 
treatment rather than to the equal rights of the several indivi-
duals affected by the social action, policy or institution in ques-
tion. That is, it appeals to a human right to equality rather than 
to equal human rights. For another, equitable treatment is 
essentially just treatment. Hence, to appeal to this right presup-
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poses sorne standard of justice in terms of which this right is 
defined. It would be circular reasoning to then attempt to 
ground justice upon this right to justice. 
Finally, it is a serious error to imagine that social justice 
demands respect for human rights only. Indeed, social justice 
has a special concern for rights that are not universal to all 
human s as humans but special rights conferred by social roles, 
e. g., one's rights as a wife or husband, as a dependent child, 
as a judge, as a property owner, and especially as a citizen. It 
is a gross social injustice to deny the vote to blacks, women or 
the impoverished. But the right to vote is a civic, not a human 
right; it is a right that any individual possesses, not as a human 
being, but as a member of society. Hence, there is no social 
injustice in refusing to allow nonresidents equal opportunities to 
vote in one's society. An important part of the demand for 
social justice in modern societies has been the demand for 
social security. Even the United Nations half-recognizes that it 
is a mi~take to ground this aspect of social justice upon a 
human right. Article Twenty-two of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights reads in part, «Everyone, as a member of 
society, has a right to social security ... ». Thus, even when 
social justice is grounded on a fundamental moral right, this 
need not be a human right. Another species of moral rights, 
and one more specifically relevant to social justice, consists of 
civic rights, those moral rights the individual possesses as a 
citizen, as a member of a given society. Vlastos unduly restricts 
the range of moral rights that bear crucially upon social justice. 
There is a deeper wisdom in the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Article Nine affirms the right 
of «every man» to be counted innocent until he has be en con-
victed,but Article Fourteen asserts the right of «every citizen» 
to a free voice in determining the necessity of public contribu-
tions, the appropiation of them, and their amount, mode of 
assessment, and duration. Such civic rights are at least as rele-
vant to social justice as human rights are, and les ser species of 
moral rights are not entirely irrelevant. 1 conclude that the 
attempt to ground social justice exclusively on human rights 
mu,st inevitably fail. 
We are left, it would seem, with one remaining obvious 
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alternative. Since social justice is not grounded on human 
rights, perhaps human rights are grounded on social justice. In 
one brief passage, John Rawls himself hints darkly at such 
a view. 
Thus justice as faimess has the characteristic marks of a natu-
ral rights theory. Not only does it ground fundamental rights 
on natural attributes and distinguish their bases from social 
norms, but it assigns rights to persons by principies of equal 
justice, these principies having a special force against which 
other values cannot normally prevail (p. 506n). 
Charles Beitz explicitly adopts and defends the thesis that 
human rights are grounded on social justice. 
According to the social justice model, human rights are enti-
tlements to the satisfaction of various human interests that 
would be guaranteed to members of a group by principies of 
social justice roughly in Rawls's sense: principies of justice 
express the conditions under which social institutions may be 
regarded as morally legitimate, and these conditions, in the 
first instance, have to do with the manner in which a society's 
basic institutional structure distributes the benefits and bur-
dens of social cooperation (p. 59). 
It is, however, Rex Martin who, in Rawls and Rights, has 
most systematically explained the way in which human rights 
might be grounded on social justice within a Rawlsian 
theory. 
This sort of theory has considerable plausibility. Since the 
concept of a human right is a essentially distributive concept, it 
might seem that the appropriate sort of ground would be the 
principIes of social justice that determine how burdens and 
benefits ought to be distributed among the individual members 
of a society. There are additional reasons to adopt a Rawlsian 
approach to human rights. All the great human rights docu-
ments, and the dec1arations of natural rights that preceded 
them, are essentially political statements addressed to govern-
ments and calling for social reformo Moreover, the content of 
human rights, at least if the most influential formulations can 
be trusted, are essentially social. Witness the titles of the two 
conventions that spell out in more detail the interpretation and 
practical significance of the various rights affirmed by the Uni-
ted Nations -the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
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and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. All five categories of rights mentioned are 
essentially social. It is no wonder that Rex Martin can con-
elude at one point: 
This brings us back to the main contention that 1 have tried 
to advance in this section; namely, that for Rawls, basic 
moral rights -natural rights- are basic structure rights (and 
in that sense constitutional rights) (p. 40-41). 
Yet it is, in part, because this conelusion does seem to 
follow from a Rawlsian approach that 1 reject that approach. 
Since human rights are a species of moral rights , they must be 
distinguished from every species of institutional rights, even 
constitútional rights . Indeed, constitutional rights are often, al-
though not always, grounded on and intented to protect more 
fundamental human rights . 
There are, however, more compelling reasons to reject any 
attempt, whether Rawlsian or not, to ground human rights on 
social justice. These reasons reflect the incongruity between 
human rights and social justice. Social justice, at least if thougt 
of in the usual manner as determining the just distribution of 
burdens and benefits within a society, could not ground a speci-
fically human right. This is because the principIes of just distri-
bution within a society apply to the individual members of any 
society, not as human beings, but as members of that society. 
Charles Beitz makes this explicito 
Because the social justice model recognizes that sorne rights 
find their philosophical foundation in certain characteristics of 
human social cooperation,. it can explain the basis of (at least 
sorne of) those human rights which do not belong to persons 
as persons, but rather be long to persons because of the social 
relations in which they stand (p. 59). 
Accordingly what level of income constitutes an adequate 
standard of living or which forms of social security benefits are 
called for will vary from society to society. This explains, he 
concludes, how problematic human rights such as the right to 
an adequate standard of living or the right to social security 
can be genuine human rights in spite of the very limited resour-
ces of nonaffiuent societies. 
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To my mind, he, and others who think in these terms, have 
drawn an inappropriate conclusion. The correct conclusion is 
that many of the rights affirmed in the Universal Declaration 
are really not human rights at all but are and ought to be 
accepted as civic rights. It is civic rights, fundamental moral 
rights one possesses as a citizen or member of a society, that 
might be grounded on social justice. One would be wise, how-
ever, to draw a second conclusion, also. Social justice is not 
limited to the distribution of burdens and benefits within a 
society. A society can treat visitors, aliens and foreigners fairly 
or unfairly. Any society can and should give visitors accused of 
crimes a fair trial, have a fair immigration policy and treat 
enemy soldiers with justice, even if not always with mercy. 
Hence, one needs a broader conception of social justice than 
Beitz offers uso 
Another reason to reject every attemp to ground human 
rights on social justice is that this would preclude their direct 
relevance to interpersonal contexts. If human rights were groun-
ded upon social justice, even if broadly conceived and in non-
Rawlsian terms, they would apply directIy and in the first 
instance to the society and only indirectIy and through its insti-
tutions to those individual persons affected by those social ins-
titutions. Rex Martin makes this implication explicit. 
In talk of specifically human or natural rights, it is assumed 
that human beings live in societies. The goods that are identi-
fied in claims-to are here conceived as goods obtained and 
enjoyed in a social setting. That is, such goods are conceived 
as provided peculiarly or especia11y through life in a society. 
They are not, in short, thought to be attained principa11y, if at 
a11, on a mere individual-person-to-a11-others basis (p. 36). 
He offers two sorts of evidence to support this way of inter-
preting human rights. All the great human rights manifestoes 
are addressed to governments in particular, and the content of 
specific human rights is essentially social. 
1 do not believe that he has proved his case. It is true that 
the great natural rights and human rights manifestoes do focus 
on social issues. But this is because they are polemical docu-
ments written for political purposes, such as to justify the Ame-
rican Revolution or to provide a moral standard for the United 
Nations, and not because of the nature of human rights per se. 
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Again, although it is true that sorne human rights do, because 
of their content, apply primarily to social contexts, this is not 
true of them aH. The rights to a fair trial or to equal protection 
of the laws do apply directly to the society and its institutions 
and only indirectly to the human individual s affected by those 
institutions. But other human rights, such as the rights to tife, 
security of the person, and privacy, hold «against the world». 
These human rights apply just as directlY to individual second 
parties as to governments or to private organizations. This 
direct relevance of many human rights to interpersonal confron-
tations cannot be explained by any theory that would derive 
those rights from social justice. We must, therefore, abandon 
every attempt to ground human rights on social justice. 
When aH is said and done, what is the relation between 
social justice and human rights? The most obvious conclusion 
we have reached is negative; there is no single simple relation 
between them. Rights cannot be defined in terms of justice, nor 
can justice be defined in terms of rights. Social justice is not 
based exclusively upon human rights, and human rights are not 
grounded on social justice. Although this negative outcome of 
our philosophical inquiry may seem disappointing, it is impor-
tant because it disabuses us of the common presupposition that 
social justice and human rights are necessarily and uniformly 
connected. 
More positively, we may conclude that there are a number 
of separate and limited relations between social justice and 
human rights. Sorne, although not aH, human rights are defined 
in terms of justice because of their, specific contento These 
include the right to a fair trial, more broadly, the right to due 
process, and probably the right to equitable treatment. Human 
rights do hold against society, although not exclusively so, and 
among the most important duties of social justice are those 
obligations imposed by respect for human rights. An important 
aspect of social justice is equalitarian, the demand that society 
respect equaHy the human rights of aH persons, citizens and 
noncitizens alike. This is one ground, although not the only 
one, for objecting to racial, religious, sexual, political or econo-
mic discrimination by any society. Several fundamental moral 
rights grounded on social justice are misconstrued as human 
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rights. ActualIy, rights such as the right to social security, the 
right to participate in the government of ones 'society, and the 
right to equal opportunity are civic rights, moral rights the indi-
vidual possesses as a member of a society. In short, the reality 
is more complicated and less neat than our theories have led us 
to believe. As philosophers and jurist we must work together to 
achieve a fulIer and richer understanding of the several rda-
tions between the justice of a society and the moral rights indi-
viduals possess as human beings. 
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